If you are injured in Illinois by someone while they are working for someone else, who is liable? For example, if you are in a car accident with a delivery truck, is the driver liable or the delivery company? This is the concept of “Respondeat Superior” and can have very serious consequences for your personal injury case.
Because these legal concepts are very old, so too is the terminology that applies to it. Generally, one who is doing something for someone else is their “agent” or “servant.” The one for whom the task is being done is the “master” or “principal.”
In a master/servant relationship, a principal can be held liable for the wrongful conduct of an agent if the conduct is committed within the scope of that relationship. This is known as the doctrine of “Respondeat Superior.” It most commonly arises in the context of an employer's liability for the
negligent conduct of an employee. In limited circumstances, however, an employer may also be held vicariously liable under Illinois law for the intentional torts or other misconduct of an employee.
The principal's (or master's) liability is derived from his or her relationship to the agent, or servant. A master is one who has the right to control the manner and method of work performed. A servant is one whose work is subject to the supervision or control of the master. By contrast, an independent contractor is a person hired for a particular purpose or project, who is compensated on a project-by-project basis, and who exercises his own discretion over the manner and method of carrying out the work. This distinction is critical, because, generally, one who hires an independent contractor is not liable for the acts or omissions of the independent contractor.
However, Illinois courts have adopted an exception to the general rule in situations where one entrusts work to an independent contractor, but retains control of any part of the work. In that case, the principal may be subject to liability for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty to exercise reasonable care, which is caused by his failure to exercise his control over the independent contractor with reasonable care. This is often referred to as the “retained control” doctrine.
If a master/servant relationship exists, the master can be held liable for the acts of the servant that occur within the scope of the agency relationship. Conduct will usually fall within the scope of the relationship when it is of the same general nature as the servant's work, and is committed at least in partial furtherance of the master's business at an authorized time and place. Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the time or
geographic limits of the work, and not motivated by the purpose of serving the employer's interests. Whether a purported agent's acts are within the scope of the agency is usually a fact question to be determined by the trier of fact based on all the circumstances, but may be decided as a matter of law.
Unfortunately, the term “scope of employment” has been interpreted in many ways. Traditionally, it meant those acts which were so closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods of carrying out the objectives of the employment. But, minor deviations relating to time and place often fall within the scope of employment. A servant's deviation from routine time and geographic locations for personal reasons may still be sufficiently related to the master's business to subject the master to liability. The fact that a servant combines personal business with the master's business at the time of the negligent conduct will not necessarily relieve the master of liability for the act. For example, if our delivery driver stopped at a convenience store for a drink and caused the accident while pulling back into traffic, that would probably be a minor variation that would not relieve the delivery company of liability under Illinois law.
On the other hand, an unauthorized deviation far beyond those reasonably associated with the principal's business is commonly referred to as a “frolic.” It usually consists of the pursuit of the servant's personal business unrelated to his or her employment. A master will not be held liable for the acts of a servant committed on a frolic unless a plaintiff can show that the servant had ended the frolic and returned to the pursuit of the principal's business when the negligent conduct occurred. For example, our delivery driver decides to go a few miles out of his way to make an appearance at a party during work hours. On the way to the party, which is not on his delivery route, the driver causes an accident. That would be a frolic, and the delivery company would not be responsible for the driver's negligence under Illinois law.
Even deliberate or criminal acts of a servant may result in vicarious liability on the master if the master directed the use of force in the performance of the work, or ratified the intentional misconduct. This may be true even where the servant commits an intentional tort with the dual purpose of furthering the master's interest and venting personal anger. Of course, where the act is completely outside the scope of authority, the master will have no liability. For example, a bouncer employed by a tavern punches an unruly patron before throwing him out the door. The tavern owner may be liable for the patron’s injuries even though they were the result of an intentional act if he authorized the use of physical force to maintain order in the establishment.
A master can also be held liable under Illinois law for the wrongful, unauthorized acts of a servant if it can be shown that the master hired or retained the servant when he or she knew or should have known that the servant was unfit for the position. Under these circumstances, the master can be sued directly for his or her own negligence in hiring or retaining the servant. Suits based on negligent hiring, negligent entrustment, or negligent retention are separate and distinct from vicarious liability based upon Respondeat Superior. For example, if an off-duty sheriff's deputy sexually assaults someone, the Sheriff's Department is not liable for the deputy's conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior
because the act was not performed on the department's behalf, was done on the deputy's own time, and
did not in any way further the Department's business. However, the Department could have liability for failing to use reasonable care in determining whether the deputy was fit for the job, was properly trained, or was properly supervised, particularly if he was retained after the incident and the deputy causes another injury.
Likewise, in certain situations case law supports the concept that off-duty employees may be found to be acting within the scope of his employment. One regular area where this occurs is with off-duty police officers. Police officers are always obligated to attempt to prevent the commission of a crime in their presence, so any actions taken by them toward that end, even during off-duty hours, falls within the performance of their duties as police officers. Of course, certain actions by an employee are so obviously outside the scope of employment, that even evidence of the position of the employee is not enough to find liability, such as if an off-duty officer actually contributes to or commits a crime.
Obviously, Illinois laws regarding master/servant relationships can be very complicated and highly technical. If you have been injured by someone who appeared to be working for someone else, you should contact an Illinois attorney with experience in personal injury that can guide you through the process of making your claims and ensuring you receive all of the money to which you are entitled for your injuries.
